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Abstract. This article analyzes the impact of incomplete contracts’ length on investment in
a bilateral relationship. The seller has the power to set the contract terms whereas the buyer
decides on the investment level, which acts as a cap on future demand. Two-part tariffs succeed
in implementing the optimal investment and consumption even if commitment is limited, and
the length of the contract is irrelevant. Interestingly, this efficient solution is rendered possi-
ble by subsidies on consumption during the contract. In other terms, duration matters hugely
for the contractual details (the timing of transfers), not for its performance. Under certain
circumstances that we discuss, linear pricing may have to be used, which leads to suboptimal
investment. We show that longer contracts are less efficient, meaning that a degree of com-
pleteness (pricing width) may be strictly complementary to another one (contract length). The
buyer’s surplus increases with respect to contract length, whereas the seller loses more in profit
than the social surplus decreases. A longer contract actually protects expropriable investors
rather than the investment itself.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers markets in which the short-run demand elasticity is low because demand is
largely pre-determined by specific installed capital with which the buyer is caught. Investment
decisions involve not only a qualitative choice (specific technology), but also a quantitative one
(capacity). Oil and gas pipelines are the paragon of specific investment, where the initial capacity
choice acts as a cap on volumes subsequently traded. In the short run, buyers of energy (oil,
natural gas, or electricity) are locked into a previously chosen technology or standard (appliances
in Balestra’s and Nerlove’s 1966 terminology), or tied to a specific supplier (in the case of
pipelines). In the long run, fuel substitution will follow the path of capital substitution, making
the elasticity much higher.
What happens if market power matters? Markups can rise high with low elasticities, but
in the long run price elasticity typically increases.1 The seller has to be careful to preserve his
consumer base over time, and he must adopt reasonable tariffs if he doesn’t want to kill the
goose that lays golden eggs.
The model studies in detail a bilateral relationship in which a potential or actual investment
is specific. Commitment is a critical issue: though reasonable prices may be announced to
encourage investment in the specific appliances, these announcements are more or less credible.
If commitment is limited, buyers may fear hold-up, i.e. unilateral price increases that will extract
a rent from the installed capital.
Discrete-continuous choice models in the econometric literature on consumer demand
(Dubin-McFadden 1984, Hanemann 1984) usually assume that each buyer makes essentially
one farsighted decision, namely the technology he adopts. Balestra and Nerlove (1966) build
a dynamic model where at any given point in time only one fraction of the market, the non-
committed consumers (new consumers or those who replace their appliances), can choose their
fuel, and once this choice is made, consumption varies freely in response to price. Not only do
these models assume that production is competitive and that consumers are price-takers, they
also disregard an important feature of the investment decision that constrains future consump-
tion decisions, the capacity choice.
This feature is also neglected by industrial organization literature on standard competition or
aftermarket monopolization (Shapiro 1995, Chen et al. 1998, Reitzes and Woroch 2008), which
focuses on the optimal strategy of firms trying to attract customers who, once locked in, will be
at the mercy of their market power. These models make rather extreme assumptions about the
link between equipment and complementary goods. Some assume strict complementarity (one
primary good for one aftermarket good, see Carlton and Waldman, 2001), so that there is one
decision to be made—equipment. Alternatively, others assume independence—demand ex post
can be adjusted freely (e.g. Borenstein et al., 2000, Morita and Waldman, 2004). In our model,
complementarity is asymmetric: the buyer cannot consume more than his capacity allows, but
he is free to consume less. This is typically the case with energy-consuming appliances.
Examples could also be taken from the R&D sector. Firms investing in specific production
lines that need to pay license fees for intellectual property rights gauge their investment according
to the intended intensity of license use. Here again, elasticity is asymmetric: it is easier to
slow down production than to exceed capacity. Another example is the franchisor/franchisee
relationship: when a franchisee chooses an outlet of a given size and location, his investment
caps his future sales capacity, then the payment to the franchisor (in addition to a fixed fee)
1See the Le Chatelier principle in Samuelson (1947).
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typically consists in royalties calculated as a percentage of his turnover. The main difference with
the traditional literature on incomplete contracts, investment and hold-up2 is that investment
itself is a strategy against the seller’s potential abuses.
Contract incompleteness affects both the overall performance of the relationship and the
distribution of the generated surplus. To pre-empt possible contract failures, some general rules
can be agreed on, without compromising future negotiations about contractual details. For
example, in their analysis of natural gas contracts, Crocker and Masten (1985) explain how
take-or-pay provisions, by allocating discretionary power to the informed party, ensure that the
optimal decisions are taken at investment and operations stages.3 In our view, contract length
and width can be seen as key features of the “ ‘constitution’ governing the ongoing relationship”
(Goldberg, 1976, p. 428). The constitution could be either a prior agreement between the
parties, or even a general purpose law governing some commercial relationship. This view
motivates our comparative statics analysis of contract length in relation with restrictions on the
price structure (width).
Complete contracts are, by definition, unlimited; in contrast, contracts with limited width
may be optimized with respect to length in compensation. Conventional wisdom has it that
long contracts protect investors. Eventually, one would expect the investment level and social
welfare to rise as the commitment duration increases,4 the extra surplus being shared between
the parties depending on their bargaining powers.
Clearly, a time limit may be necessary to avoid applying obsolete clauses, especially if some
random factor drives the economy away from the initial conditions on the basis of which the con-
tract was calibrated (Crocker and Masten, 1988). However, even in the absence of uncertainty,
long incomplete contracts may have undesirable effects.
In our model, as the contract becomes longer, the buyer’s incentives to invest regress while
the seller’s ability to extract rent diminishes. With linear prices, the negative impact on social
welfare of a longer contract is very unequally shared between the parties: the buyer’s surplus
increases as he produces less surplus but can keep a much larger part of it, whereas the seller is a
net loser.5 A longer contract actually protects expropriable investors rather than the investment
itself.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. We analyze various sce-
narios with two-part tariffs in section 3. Linear contracts are then characterized: we start with
simple cases (full commitment, no commitment) in section 4 and we expose the case of par-
tial commitment, i.e. with expiry date, in section 5. Most of the proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2See Williamson (1971) for an early reference.
3Hubbard and Weiner (1986) offer an alternative interpretation of take-or-pay provisions in terms of risk
sharing. See Creti and Villeneuve (2004) for a survey.
4 This is the thesis in the empirical study by Joskow (1988). He finds evidence of a positive relationship between
asset “specificity” (as measured by different proxies) and contract length. See also Neumann and Hirschhausen
(2008).
5Castaneda (2006) also finds a negative effect of longer contracts on investment, but in his model both parties
are worse off. The contract in his analysis is such that the buyer pays upfront a lump sum and that the seller
invests after acceptance. The buyer thus is reluctant to accept long contracts that would establish extortion for
a long time, meaning in turn that the seller’s return on them is poor, which depresses investment.
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2 General setting
2.1 Trade and payoffs
The game involves two players: the seller and the buyer. The model is in continuous time
with infinite horizon. At instant t, the seller sells to the buyer a quantity qt of a commodity
produced at a constant unit cost c ; he receives in exchange a payment τt , expressed in units of
the numéraire good.
The instantaneous utility of the buyer is quasi-linear. It can be written (up to some irrelevant
constant) u(qt)− τt . We will use the iso-elastic utility function
(1) u(q) = ε d
1
ε
ε−1 q
ε−1
ε ,
where d is a positive scale parameter and where ε is the price elasticity of demand. We assume
that ε > 1.
The seller sets the tariffs {τt(·), t ≥ 0} where the argument of τt(·) is qt . Only linear and
two-part tariffs are used. The general shape of the total payment at date t to the seller for
quantity qt is therefore τt(qt) = mt + ptqt , where mt is a per-time-unit fixed fee and pt is the
marginal price.
Thus, the instantaneous buyer demand Q(·) exhibits constant price elasticity:
(2) Q(pt) = dp−εt .
The inverse demand function Q−1 is denoted P .
The consumption of the commodity requires an equipment with an indefinite service life,
installed at date t = 0, whose size A determines maximum consumption once and for all. For
example if the equipment is a pipeline, imports cannot exceed the pipeline’s capacity:
(3) qt = min{Q(pt), A}.
Unless otherwise specified, the investment cost (k per unit) is assumed to be borne by the
buyer, who chooses non-cooperatively the investment size A (the case where the seller is the
investor is also discussed further on). The future is discounted at rate r .
The intertemporal surplus of the buyer is
(4) S =
∫ +∞
0
(u(qt)− τt(qt))e−r t dt − kA.
The intertemporal profit of the seller is
(5) Π =
∫ +∞
0
(τt(qt)− cqt)e−r t dt.
The first best. The social optimum requires u′(qt) = c+ rk , which means constant consump-
tion: ∀t, qt = Q(c + rk). The term rk is the unit amortization cost of the durable investment.
The efficient investment is thus
(6) A∗ = Q(c + rk).
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2.2 Market power and limited commitment
Trade takes place only after the equipment has been built, however trading terms can be deter-
mined beforehand by means of an agreed tariff.
1. At date 0, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer consisting of tariffs
{τt(·), t ∈ [0, T )}, valid until T . The buyer accepts this offer if it leaves him with a
non-negative surplus.
2. The buyer invests A.
3. From t = 0 to T , the buyer purchases qt at each date t.
4. At date T , the contract expires. At each date t ≥ T , the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the buyer consisting of tariff τt(·). The buyer accepts this offer if it leaves him
with a non-negative instantaneous surplus, and consumes the corresponding qt .
Without loss of generality, the seller’s pricing strategies can be restricted to constant marginal
prices over each period: p0 during the first period (0 ≤ t < T ) and pT during the second period
(for t ≥ T ). The way the fixed payments are staggered over time within the first period does not
matter in the sense that paying mt at all dates t ∈ [0, T ) is equivalent to an upfront payment6
(7) M0 =
∫ T
0
mte
−r t dt.
The contract can be summarized by (M0, p0).
In the 4th step, the buyer cannot change his investment, thus whether the seller offers a
durable contract or (as we assume) a short-term contract does not make a difference. Indeed,
any optimal contract has to implement the same successive identical offers.
The following sections will discuss performance of the market with respect to the first-best
allocation. The analysis will focus on a bilateral relationship where the investor is the buyer; the
case where the seller invests will also be discussed.
3 Two-part tariffs
3.1 Unlimited commitment (T = +∞)
Implementation of the first-best is straightforward. If p0 = c and the fixed fee is reasonable (i.e.
such that the buyer participates), the buyer invests A∗. To extract the surplus, the seller must
choose
(8) M0 =
1
r
(u(A∗)− (c + rk)A∗) ,
which is the present value of the perpetual flow u(A∗)− (c + rk)A∗. This is the generalization
of the well-known static result.
6Liquidity constraints on either player could limit this freedom, which we do not consider.
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3.2 Limited commitment (0 < T < +∞)
At date T the investment A is sunk and nothing can prevent the seller from exerting hold-up on
the buyer by setting at each instant a tariff that captures the entire surplus from the relationship.
For t ≥ T , any tariff scheme (mt , pT ) such that pT ≤ P (A) (to avoid under-consumption) and
mt + (pT − c)A = u(A) (to ensure participation) will do. A simple example is pT = c combined
with a fixed fee mt = u(A),∀t ≥ T .
The buyer anticipates that he will obtain no surplus from T on. Assume the price during the
first period is constant and denoted by p0. After rearrangement, the buyer solves:
(9) max
A
1−e−rT
r
(
u(A)−
(
p0 +
rk
1−e−rT
)
A
)
−M0,
where the expression reveals that, due to expropriation ex post, the investment A has to be
amortized during the first period. The equivalent flow cost of investment is thus rk
1−e−rT per unit
of equipment.
The buyer will invest
(10) A = Q
(
p0 +
rk
1− e−rT
)
,
under the condition that M0 is small enough to ensure participation.
The seller anticipates that he can obtain the total surplus from T on, whose present value
is e
−rT
r (u(A)− cA). He solves
max
M0,p0
Π(M0, p0) = M0 +
1−e−rT
r (p0 − c)Q(p0 + rk1−e−rT )
+ e
−rT
r
[
u
(
Q(p0 +
rk
1−e−rT )
)
− cQ(p0 + rk1−e−rT )
]
s.t. M0 ≤ 1−e−rTr
[
u
(
Q(p0 +
rk
1−e−rT )
)
− (p0 + rk1−e−rT )Q(p0 + rk1−e−rT )
]
.
(11)
Clearly, the seller will choose the largest possible fixed fee and the corresponding profit-
maximizing price.
Proposition 1. When the seller can commit to a two-part tariff (M0, p0) for a limited duration
T , he will set a marginal price below his marginal cost:
(12) p0 = c − e−rT1−e−rT rk,
This leads the buyer to undertake the optimal investment A∗ = Q(c + rk). The fixed fee allows
the seller to capture the entire first-stage surplus:
(13) M0 = 1−e
−rT
r (u(A
∗)− (c + rk)A∗) .
Then the following tariff allows him to capture the entire second-stage surplus:
(14) For all t > T, mt = u(A∗) and pT = c.
An interesting feature of this game is that the consumption good is subsidized during the
contract: it is priced below its marginal cost, the subsidy being the amortization of capital
from date T on, i.e. it is an advance compensation for the hold-up period. The shorter the
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contract duration and the larger the investment cost, the more generous the first-stage unit
price reduction must be in order to stimulate investment. Remark that p0 is negative if T is
sufficiently short.
The two instruments of the contract play different roles: p0 is used to give the right invest-
ment incentives to the buyer, and M0 transfers the surplus to the seller. The seller is willing to
set a below-cost unit price in order to encourage investment because this does not prevent him
from capturing the entire surplus from the relationship, through the fixed fee in the first stage,
then by exerting hold-up after expiry of the contract.
3.3 No commitment (T = 0)
Suppose now the seller cannot commit to a tariff (M0, p0) (in other words, T = 0). This is
the pure hold-up situation: once the investment is made, the seller will repeatedly set the same
tariff (m, p) that captures the entire ex post surplus for each period, which means that the
buyer cannot recoup his investment costs. As a consequence, the buyer’s surplus if he invests is
negative. Therefore, if the seller cannot commit to a unit price before the buyer invests, there
is no equilibrium with positive investment. No commitment and powerful tools is the worst-case
scenario.
3.4 Endogenous duration
The first-best investment level can be attained whatever T > 0. The interest of the alternative
scenarios with respect to T lie in the timing of transfers and the structure of tariffs. In all cases,
the whole surplus goes into the seller’s hands. In the analysis, the contract duration T is treated
as exogenous. Now suppose the seller or the buyer has the power to determine the contract’s
duration. All durations T > 0 are equivalent for both players, while T = 0 is inefficient, thus
the choice will be any strictly positive duration.
3.5 Investment by the seller
Suppose the investment is made by the seller. Fixed fees allow a monopolistic seller to capture
the entire surplus both during and after the contract, therefore it is optimal for him to choose
the first-best investment level A∗ and to always set the variable price p = c + rk to induce a
consumption equal to A∗. In fact, whether the investment is undertaken by the seller or the
buyer has no bearing on the outcome.
4 Linear tariffs: simple cases
Let’s recall first a basic characteristic of static monopolistic markets. Let’s suppose the fixed
part of a two-part tariff is capped by regulation, and let’s see what happens when the cap goes
down. Obviously, if the cap is high enough, the seller achieves the first-best by setting a price
equal to his marginal cost and extracts the entire surplus through the fixed fee (see previous
sections). If the cap on the fixed part is lower, the seller must decrease the fixed fee and raise the
marginal price above marginal cost (the buyer’s surplus is still zero). If the cap on the fixed part
falls further, the seller continues to set the highest possible fee but stops raising the marginal
price. This happens when the marginal price has attained the optimal linear price, usually called
monopoly price.
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The latter case is the most important for our point as it can be easily extrapolated: tightly
capped two-part tariffs yield the same prices, quantities and investment level as linear tariffs,
only the surplus sharing is affected. In other words, the marginal effects of the cap and its
inframarginal effects are disconnected if the cap is sufficiently low.
A defense of linear pricing relies on its distributive role: guaranteeing the buyer a share of
the surplus is an appealing feature of linear pricing. Linear pricing may emerge as a general rule
imposed in the buyer’s interest simply because in the absence of information on future costs or
preferences, it is extremely robust as a protection against full rent extraction.7
In this section, the seller is assumed to use linear tariffs. Before solving the game for any
T , the extreme cases T = +∞ and T = 0, which provide a useful insight into how the game
functions, will be analyzed.
4.1 Unlimited commitment: Model pA
The timing is simplified, hence the name pA:
1. The seller sets a price p.
2. The buyer invests A at a unit cost k .
After this, at each instant, the buyer faces the predefined price p and purchases q. Obviously,
there is no point in a buyer overinvesting with respect to his future consumption, therefore after
observing p, the buyer will invest so that at equilibrium A equals q. He buys one unit of equipment
for each unit of commodity, so the marginal cost of one commodity unit is p + rk . Therefore,
his demand function is
(15) q(p) = Q(p + rk).
The seller equalizes marginal revenue and cost and thus picks p that solves
(16) ∂ (p Q(p + rk)) /∂q = c.
The corresponding investment is A = Q(p + rk). The results are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. In game pA the equilibrium price and investment level are
p = εc+rkε−1 ;(17)
A = Q
(
ε(c+rk)
ε−1
)
.(18)
Remember the optimal investment level is A∗ = Q(c + rk). In model pA, since the demand
function is Q(p + rk), the welfare-maximizing price is p = c . The equilibrium price is always
higher than the social optimum, so that the equilibrium investment level is always suboptimal.
7Linear prices are robust to asymmetric information about the demand parameter d in the sense that linear
tariffs do not depend on d at equilibrium (as the following analysis will show).
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4.2 No commitment: Model Ap
The timing is also simplified, hence the name Ap:
1. The buyer invests A at a unit cost k .
2. At each date t, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer pt to the buyer. If the buyer
accepts, he buys qt .
Clearly, the same price and quantities (denoted respectively by p and q) will be chosen at all
dates.
The buyer anticipates that he will suffer hold-up as soon as the investment is realized. He has
no means to obtain more than the unconstrained monopoly quantity. Even this quantity could
actually require too much investment: the buyer weighs up the initial investment cost against
the subsequent costs of purchasing the good. Depending on the parameters, he might either
passively adjust the investment to the monopoly quantity, or deliberately restrict investment,
even though this will induce a higher commodity price. These are the two regimes that are
described below.
The model is solved by backward induction.
Choice of q. In the last step, given A and p,
(19)
q = Q(p) if p ≥ P (A),
q = A if p ≤ P (A).
Choice of p. Anticipating this, the seller chooses p. The optimal price is such that
(20) ∂(p Q(p))/∂q = c,
if and only if this price effectively leads the buyer to purchase q = Q(p), i.e. if it is higher than
P (A). In this case, where the seller is not constrained by the capacity, the optimal price is such
that the Lerner index equals the inverse of the elasticity of demand: p−cp =
1
ε . This yields the
Ramsey monopoly price
(21) p =
εc
ε− 1 .
This “passive-buyer” regime prevails if and only if A ≥ Q(p). Else, when the buyer has restricted
his investment below the monopoly quantity, the seller has to set a higher price in order to equate
the corresponding demand to the equipment size: Q(p) = A, thus p = P (A). This characterizes
the “active-buyer” regime.
To summarize,
(22) p = max {p, P (A)}.
.
10
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)()( pQcp −Acp ˆ)( −
Acp )( −
p p
qcpΠ )( −=
c
When the buyer’s investment A increases,
p decreases, until it reaches p.
pˆ
Figure 1: Impact of the investment choice on the price in model Ap.
Choice of A. Solving backwards, we come to the investment choice of the buyer. See Figure
1. We saw that in the “active-buyer” regime the price P (A) decreases with respect to A. Thus
as long as this regime prevails, a larger investment yields a bigger price reduction. But when
the investment attains the monopoly quantity, this effect stops because the seller would never
decrease the price below the monopoly price p: it is never worth investing more than A = Q(p).
Actually, when the investment cost is large, the buyer prefers to invest less.
Thus, the buyers’ surplus-maximization program can be expressed as
max
A
S(A) =
1
r
(u(A)− (P (A) + rk)A)
s.t. A ≤ Q(p)
(23)
The solution A is interior when the “active-buyer” regime prevails: the seller adjusts his price so
that q = A. The optimal investment level equates marginal benefits (q/r)dp (one more unit
of equipment causes a permanent reduction dp in the commodity price) with marginal costs k :
(q/r) dp = k dA. As q = A, this can be rewritten 1r
dp
dq = −kq , which yields p = εrk , and since
by assumption p = P (A), the optimal investment level is A = Q(εrk). In response, the seller
will set8
(24) p = εrk.
The seller is constrained by this investment choice if he cannot set his monopoly price p
because Q(p) > Q(εrk), or equivalently, p < εrk . This is the case when crk < ε− 1.
8This situation combines the features of monopoly and monopsony. In the regime where p = P (A), the buyer
chooses A as a monopsonist to maximize S(A) = 1
r
(u(A)− P (A)A− rkA). The first-order condition can be
rewritten P (A)+rk−u
′(A)
P (A)
= −P
′(A)A
P (A)
≡ 1
ε
. However, while in the monopsony case the price equals the marginal cost,
here the seller’s market power allows him to set a price equal to the marginal utility of the buyer (P (A) = u′(A)).
Thus the equation can be rewritten p(A) = εrk.
11
Contents February 12, 2010
Conversely, when crk > ε− 1 then εrk < p, thus investing Q(εrk) will not prevent the seller
from setting his monopoly price. The buyer would do better to invest passively Q(p).
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 3. In game Ap, the equilibrium price and investment level are
p = max { εcε−1 , εrk},(25)
A = min {Q ( εcε−1) , Q(εrk)}.(26)
Since in both cases the capacity is fully used (q = A = Q(p)), the outcome is ex post
efficient; however, ex ante efficiency is not achieved. Indeed, the equilibrium price is always
higher than the social optimum p = c + rk , which implies that the equilibrium investment level
is always suboptimal.
4.3 Investment by the seller
An alternative assumption could be that the investment is undertaken by the seller. Let us
examine the following game:
1. The seller chooses the investment size A and sets price p.
2. The buyer purchases q indefinitely.
Commitment is not relevant here, because the optimal price for the seller does not change
over time. The solution of this game is trivial: the buyer will choose q = min {Q(p), A},
and anticipating this, the seller chooses simultaneously A and p. Obviously he will not set
A > Q(p) because the capacity would be oversized, nor A < Q(p) because he would forgo
profit opportunities (the margin p − c − rk is positive), thus necessarily q = A = Q(p) where p
maximizes Π(p) = 1r (p − (c + rk))Q(p). This is the program of a monopolist whose marginal
cost is c + rk : the equilibrium is characterized by
p = ε(c+rk)ε−1 ,(27)
A = Q(ε(c+rk)ε−1 ).(28)
This game is essentially equivalent to the game pA with buyer investment: the outcomes (in-
vestment level, profit and surplus of the parties) are the same. The seller simply increases the
commodity price by rk to pass on his investment cost.
As a matter of fact, the identity of the investor is not crucial. The real issue is whether
the game played is essentially a “two-stage game” (like this game or game pA) where the seller
plays first and the buyer has the final word, or a “three-stage game” (like game Ap) where in an
additional preliminary step the buyer takes a first move by choosing A.
5 Linear tariffs with expiry date
5.1 A general characterization
Now the linear case with positive and finite values of T will be treated. Two stages can be
distinguished: in the first stage (from t = 0 to T ) the price is p0 and consumption is q0, while
in the second stage (from t = T to +∞) the price is pT and consumption is qT .
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The contract duration T (i.e. the length of the first stage) acts as a weight given to the first
stage as opposed to the second stage, so that the basic games Ap and pA seen in the previous
section will correspond to extreme values (close to zero or to infinity) of the contract duration
in this “pAp” game.
As in game Ap, the buyer can either passively invest the capacity corresponding to the
monopoly quantity, or use his investment choice to influence the outcome. In addition, the seller
can either passively set p0 at the anticipated marginal willingness to pay of the buyer, or use p0
strategically to influence his investment behavior, typically to stimulate investment.
This defines the following alternative behaviors:
Definition 1. The buyer is said to be active when his investment choice A induces a response
pT from the seller that differs from the unconstrained monopoly price εcε−1 . Otherwise he is said
to be passive.
Definition 2. The seller is said to be active when his price choice p0 induces a response A from
the buyer that differs from A = Q(p0). Otherwise he is said to be passive.
The game is sequential, with successive decisions p0, A, q0, pT , qT . As usual, it will be solved
by backward induction, but first two lemmas will eliminate large classes of strongly dominated
strategies.
To begin with, we will prove that the investment is never oversized in the second stage, and
that the second-stage price equates demand with capacity:
Lemma 1. When the buyer is active, pT = P (A) > εcε−1 .
Proof. If A > Q( εcε−1), then A is not constraining in the second stage, and the seller can set the
unconstrained monopoly price εcε−1 . Therefore, A ≤ Q( εcε−1) and pT = p(A) ≥ εcε−1 . Since by
definition of active buyer, pT 6= εcε−1 , the lemma obtains.
Lemma 2. When the buyer is passive, p0 = pT = P (A) = εcε−1 , and the seller is also passive.
Proof. If the buyer is passive, pT = εcε−1 . Since pT = max{P (A), εcε−1}, this implies A ≥ Q( εcε−1).
Suppose A > Q( εcε−1). The choice of A only affects the first-stage game, and so does p0. This
game is solved like model pA, the difference being that trade takes place from t = 0 to T only:
the buyer will equate q0 with A, so that his program can be rewritten
(29) max
A
1−e−rT
r
[
u(A)−
(
p0 +
rk
1−e−rT
)
A
]
,
and at equilibrium the buyer’s best choice is
(30) q0 = A = Q
(
p0 +
rk
1−e−rT
)
.
Anticipating this the seller chooses
(31) p0 =
εc+ rk
1−e−rT
ε−1 >
εc
ε−1 .
But this means that A = Q(p0) < Q( εcε−1), which contradicts the assumption. Therefore,
A = Q( εcε−1). Anticipating this, the seller will set p0 at the monopoly price.
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In words, the investment capacity can never be oversized in the second stage. Otherwise,
the seller could slightly adjust his first-period price without affecting the second period; setting
the price p0 closer to the unconstrained monopoly price would enhance profits.
Now we turn to the first stage. The next lemma proves that the investment can never be
oversized in the first stage either:
Lemma 3. At equilibrium, A ≤ Q(p0).
Proof. Assume that A > Q(p0). In model pA there was no reason to overinvest with respect
to demand. Here the capacity could be adjusted to the anticipated second-stage demand and
oversized relative to first-stage demand: A > q0 = Q(p0), or equivalently p0 > P (A). Since
(from Lemmas 1 and 2) pT = P (A) ≥ εcε−1 , this requires p0 > ece−1 . But if the capacity were
strictly oversized in the first stage, this would mean that the capacity was chosen according to
the second stage, therefore a marginal change in p0 would not affect the investment size, nor
would it affect the second-stage game. Therefore, if p0 > εcε−1 , the seller would have an incentive
to deviate to a lower price, closer to his profit-maximizing price εcε−1 : this would increase his
first-stage profits without altering the second-stage game. Consequently, A > Q(p0) cannot be
an equilibrium.
The lemmas enable us to summarize the four cases in Table 1.
Seller
Active Passive
B
uy
er A
ct
iv
e p0 < pT
pT >
εc
ε−1
A = Q(pT ) < Q(p0)
p0 = pT
pT >
εc
ε−1
A = Q(p0) = Q(pT )
P
as
si
ve
IMPOSSIBLE
p0 = pT
pT =
εc
ε−1
A = Q( εcε−1)
Table 1: The 4 types of equilibrium in game pAp.
Since we are mostly interested in the situation where both players use their opportunities of
strategically influencing the other party’s behavior, we will concentrate on the case where the
seller and the buyer are active.
The other cases are treated in the Appendix.
5.2 When an active seller faces an active buyer
Whenever the buyer is active, he solves:
(32) max
A
1−e−rT
r (u(A)− p0A) + e
−rT
r (u(A)− P (A)A)− kA,
where the first term is the present buyer utility from the contract, the second term is the present
utility for the subsequent period, and the third is investment cost. The fact that the buyer is
active enables us to replace pT with P (A); Lemma 3 enables us to replace consumption in the
first period by A.
14
Contents February 12, 2010
We find
(33) A = Q
(
p0 +
r
1−e−rT k
1 + 1ε
e−rT
1−e−rT
)
.
Since the seller is active, p0 < pT : the seller offers a lower price in the first period so that
the buyer is incited to invest more, then once the capacity is fixed he sets a higher price. To
choose p0, the seller solves
(34) max
p0
[
1−e−rT
r (p0 − c) + e
−rT
r
(
p0+
r
1−e−rT k
1+ 1
ε
e−rT
1−e−rT
− c
)]
Q
(
p0 +
r
1−e−rT k
1 + 1ε
e−rT
1−e−rT
)
.
This yields the optimal contract price
(35) p0 = 11−e−rT
[(
1− εe−rT
ε+e−rT
)
εc
ε−1 +
(
1− ε2e−rT
ε+e−rT
)
rk
ε−1
]
.
Finally, we need to check under which conditions the buyer and the seller are actually active.
To ensure A < Q( εcε−1) and A < Q(p0), we calculate from equations (33) and (35) that the
ratio of the production and investment costs must verify respectively crk < εe
rT and crk <
(ε − 1)erT − 1ε . Clearly the latter inequality implies the former: both players are active if and
only if
(36)
c
rk
< (ε− 1)erT − 1
ε
.
Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for both players to be active for all T is
(37)
c
rk
< ε− 1− 1
ε
.
Note that for the right hand-side to be positive, the elasticity of demand must exceed 1+
√
5
2 '
1.6, the Golden Ratio.
Proposition 4 (Both players active for any contract duration). When crk < ε− 1− 1ε ,
If T > 0,
p0 =
1
1−e−rT
[(
1− εe−rT
ε+e−rT
)
εc
ε−1 +
(
1− ε2e−rT
ε+e−rT
)
rk
ε−1
]
,
pT =
ε2(c+rk)
(ε+e−rT )(ε−1).
(38)
If T = 0, p0 is irrelevant and pT = εrk.
The equilibrium is discontinuous at 0, meaning that no commitment (T = 0) and “some”
commitment (T > 0) are qualitatively different.
5.3 Impact of the contract duration
Since A = Q(pT ) is a decreasing function of pT , which (from Proposition 4) is an increasing
function of T , the following paradoxical result obtains.
Proposition 5 (Investment). The equilibrium investment level decreases with respect to the
contract duration for all T > 0.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium prices as a function of the contract duration (when crk < ε− 1− 1ε ).
In other terms, to encourage investment, the smallest contract is the best, no contract at
all is the worst case.
Since the seller cannot commit to refrain from hold-up after contract expiry, his only means
to stimulate investment is to offer at t = 0, before A is chosen, the guarantee of a low price
until T . The smaller T , the more generous the bargain must be: p0 can even be negative, i.e.
consumption is subsidized during the contract when the contract duration is short. When T is
close to zero but still strictly positive, p0 becomes infinitely negative (see Figure 2). But when
T = 0 the game is radically altered, because the seller has no possibility to induce a higher
investment than the level corresponding to the monopoly price: the investment suddenly falls.
This is reflected in a discontinuity in the second-stage hold-up price pT = P (A) (upward jump
when the duration goes from T > 0 to T = 0).
Since social welfare increases with respect to the investment level, Proposition 5 implies that
welfare decreases with respect to the contract duration. As for the seller’s profit and the buyer’s
surplus, when crk < ε− 1− 1ε , they read respectively
Π = 1r
c+rk
ε−1 Q
(
ε2(c+rk)
(e−rT+ε)(ε−1)
)
;(39)
S = 1r
1−e−rT+ 1
ε
e−rT
ε−1
ε2(c+rk)
(e−rT+ε)(ε−1) Q
(
ε2(c+rk)
(e−rT+ε)(ε−1)
)
.(40)
The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 6 (Welfare). When crk < ε− 1− 1ε , for all T > 0,
1. Social welfare decreases with respect to T .
2. The seller’s profit decreases with respect to T .
3. The buyer’s surplus increases with respect to T .
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Figure 3: Profit of the seller, surplus of the buyer and social welfare as a function of the contract
duration (when crk < ε− 1− 1ε ).
With linear prices, more commitment through longer contracts is detrimental to the seller
and has the effect of depressing investment.
In a nutshell, the reason is that the first price p0 serves to push investment whereas pT serves
to extract rents. We have a clear analogy with the static monopoly case recalled at the beginning
of Section 4: the two successive prices approach a two-part tariff, the first price providing the
marginal incentives (investment) and the second price the inframarginal ones (participation).
Though the performance of these linear prices is imperfect, this view clarifies the effects of T
across agents, and for the economy, as we explain now.
The attempt to approach the optimum is less successful with long commitments. As T
increases, the hold-up period gets farther away, and pushing investment through price rebates
in the first period becomes costly to the seller. Of course the rebate can be smaller if it can
be sustained for a longer time; still, the profitable period is rejected to a farther future, which
imposes a clear opportunity cost. As a consequence, a large T induces a smaller A, which means
lower social surplus and lower profits.
What about the buyer? As T increases, the buyer’s surplus increases. In other terms, as
social surplus decreases by one unit, the buyer’s surplus does increase by more than one.
At the beginning of Section 4, we recalled the protective role for the buyer of a cap on the
fixed fee. Longer durations are similar to lower (i.e. more constraining) caps: the longer the
commitment, the more limited the hold-up period. In compensation, as the second price loses
impact, the seller has to mix in the first price two objectives (incentives and rent extraction),
which is the typical limit of plain static linear prices.
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5.4 Investment by the seller
If the seller invests, there is no need to create incentives and extract rents in two separate
episodes: he can and will replicate the same price in the first and second stages. This means
that contract duration does not matter. The contract in effect necessarily gives the solution of
game pA seen in Section 4, which is equivalent to the case T = +∞ in the pAp game.
Does this solve the seller’s problem? In fact, the seller would prefer to let the buyer invest.
The reasoning is as follows. If the seller invests, he can invest at the level that he wishes, but
the linear prices limit his ability to extract the rent thus generated. Since the investment cost
is difficult to recoup, his incentive to invest in the first place is limited. Conversely, if the buyer
invests, the linear prices protect his effort (he is able to keep a fraction of the surplus generated).
So the incentives that the seller gives to the buyer are leveraged by the buyer’s own incentives.
This makes the seller’s contribution to investment (through subsidies) relatively small and he
uses the second price pT to extract a bigger rent.
6 Conclusion
Long-term contracts on specific assets have been repeatedly under the scrutiny of the com-
petition authorities in Europe. The divide is between the pro-competition line of argument
(foreclosure establishes durably abusive market power, e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1987) and the
pro-investment line of argument (contracts offer protection against expropriation). The 2007
Energy Sector Inquiry states that “long-term supply agreements seem to foreclose the avail-
ability of crucial inputs for actual or potential competition” (p. 66). On the other hand, the
2004 Directive on Security of Natural Gas Supply emphasizes their positive impact on invest-
ment, underlining that “long-term contracts have played a very important role in securing gas
supplies for Europe and will continue to do so” (recital 11). Though the latter view is largely
supported by the energy industry, the link between contract duration and investment incentives
in a noncompetitive environment has not been thoroughly established by economic theory. One
reason is that duration is not just another parameter in a contract, complete or incomplete. Its
interaction with other dimensions can be quite counterintuitive.
In this paper, we have examined a situation where contracts are incomplete in several re-
spects: both the pricing structure and the duration of commitment are restricted.
All the pricing schemes that we have analyzed share the following feature: some commitment
(T > 0) is always better than none (T = 0). The reason is intuitive: the seller can offer a
significant rebate that gives the buyer perfect or at least fairly good incentive to invest. The
commitment period secures the indispensable thrust.
A longer contract never gives higher investment incentives. Tariffs with a sufficient “width”
(such as two-part tariffs) are powerful enough to make the contract length irrelevant (provided
T > 0). With linear tariffs, the investment level is a strictly decreasing function of the contract
length. A shorter subsidy period concentrates the effort, but it doesn’t diminish the incentives
that can be conveyed. Moreover, a shorter commitment limits the postponement of the profitable
hold-up period, mechanically limiting the opportunity cost. Accordingly, when the contract
duration is very short, the seller will choose to subsidize investment heavily to maximize the
surplus that will subsequently be extracted. In this sense, length and width of the contract are
complements.
With linear tariffs, social welfare, the seller’s profit and the buyer’s surplus do not vary in
parallel when contract length changes. The analogy is the following: in a static monopoly model,
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it is possible to increase the buyer’s surplus by restricting the use of two-part tariffs. One option
is to put a cap on the fixed part, or even to eliminate it. Albeit inefficient, pure linear pricing
may afford the buyer more surplus than other solutions. In our model, the first period is the
one during which investment incentives are set up by the seller. The seller tries to make the
buyer invest and consume as if prices were exactly equal to marginal costs. The second period
in contrast acts like the fixed part, serving to extract surplus: requiring that the commitment
period be long means that there is a cap on the rent extracted by the seller, which benefits the
buyer.
The analogy is imperfect, if only because two linear prices cannot strictly replicate nonlinear
tariffs. Nevertheless, it simply shows that a rule forcing linear prices and longer commitment on
prices could be set up as a “universal” means to protect buyers against sellers’ market power.
This would be at the expense of investment. Depending on the political game played between
the various interest groups in a society, a rule guaranteeing linear prices and forcing a certain
commitment will be imposed or opposed.
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A Appendix
The case when crk < ε− 1− 1ε was detailed in subsection 5.1. Here the general case is treated.
A.1 Linear tariffs with expiry date: general case
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we can deduce that a necessary and sufficient condition for the buyer
to be active is pT > εcε−1 . In addition, equation (33) tells us that when the buyer is active, he
anticipates that the seller will adjust the price to the investment (pT = P (A)). From equation
(33),
(41) pT =
p0 +
r
1−e−rT k
1 + 1ε
e−rT
1−e−rT
.
Conversely, when the buyer is passive, he knows that the seller will set pT = εcε−1 . The price
prevailing after contract expiry is
(42) pT = min
{
p0 +
r
1−e−rT k
1 + 1ε
e−rT
1−e−rT
,
εc
ε− 1
}
.
This enables us to write the following necessary and sufficient condition for having an active
buyer:
(43) p0 − εc
ε− 1 >
c − (ε− 1)erT rk
(ε− 1)(erT − 1) ,
The buyer is passive if and only if the opposite inequality holds. Since this situation is char-
acterized by p0 = εcε−1 , the left hand-side is equal to zero, and the following result obtains:
when
(44)
c
rk
≥ (ε− 1)erT ,
the buyer is passive—and so is the seller.
Now suppose crk < (ε − 1)erT : the buyer is active. Two subcases have to be analyzed:
passive seller and active seller. Let us start with the case where the seller is active. A necessary
and sufficient condition for having an active seller is p0 < P (A). In this case, as computed
previously (see equation 35),
p0 =
1
1−e−rT
[(
1− εe−rT
ε+e−rT
)
εc
ε−1 +
(
1− ε2e−rT
ε+e−rT
)
rk
ε−1
]
.
The condition p0 < P (A), where A is given by equation (33), can now be rewritten crk <
(ε− 1)erT − 1ε , which yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for both parties to
be active:
(45)
c
rk
< (ε− 1)erT − 1
ε
.
Accordingly, the equilibrium involves an active buyer and a passive seller if and only if (ε −
1)erT − 1ε ≤ crk < (ε− 1)erT . In this case, p0 = pT = P (A), and combining equations (41) and
(35) yields the equilibrium prices and investment level.
The results are summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 7 (Equilibrium prices in the general case).
a© If crk ≥ (ε− 1)erT , both parties are passive and
p0 = pT =
εc
ε− 1 .
b© If (ε− 1)erT − 1ε ≤ crk < (ε− 1)erT , the buyer is active and the seller is passive, and
p0 = pT = re
rT εk.
c© If crk < (ε− 1)erT − 1ε , both parties are active and
p0 =
1
1−e−rT
[(
1− εe−rT
ε+e−rT
)
εc
ε−1 +
(
1− ε2e−rT
ε+e−rT
)
rk
ε−1
]
,
pT =
ε2(c+rk)
(ε+e−rT )(ε−1) .
A.2 pAp: Comparative statics w.r.t. investment cost
p
Tpp ,0
0
a cb
10 −== ε
ε cpp T
krepp TrT ==0
Tp
0p
εε
ε
11−−
c
infk supk
k
Figure 4: Equilibrium prices as a function of the investment cost.
Intuitively, one would think that the equilibrium prices are increasing functions of the invest-
ment cost, since a higher k tends to dampen investment and consumption. This is true for
the hold-up price pT , but not necessarily for the contract price: it may be worth the seller’s
while to set a low p0, thus sacrificing first-stage profits, to induce a higher investment and more
second-stage sales at the hold-up price pT = P (A).
Let {
kinf =
e−rT
r
c
ε−1 ,
ksup =
e−rT
r
c
ε−1− 1
ε
e−rT .
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For all T , 0 < kinf < ksup. The three cases mentioned in Proposition 7 correspond respectively
to k ≤ kinf , kinf < k ≤ ksup and k > ksup, and and to zones a©, b©, and c© in Figure 4.
a© k ≤ kinf : both parties are passive. In the second stage, the seller will be able to set
his unconstrained monopoly price pT = εcε−1 only if the invested capacity is sufficiently large.
Therefore, as long as setting his monopoly price p0 = εcε−1 in the first stage induces a sufficiently
large investment A ≥ Q( εcε−1), the seller has no incentive to deviate, and he will set in both
stages p0 = pT = εcε−1 . This will be the case when the investment cost k is not too large: the
buyer responds passively to the contract price by setting A = Q( εcε−1).
When k becomes larger, the buyer compensates the higher unit cost of equipment by re-
ducing his investment to A < Q( εcε−1). The seller then necessarily sets in the second stage
the corresponding hold-up price pT = P (A) > εcε−1 . In the first stage, two possible choices are
available to the seller, knowing that q0 = min{A,Q(p0)}. Either he passively sets p0 such that
at equilibrium p0 = pT = P (A) and in particular p0 = P (q0) (case b© below), or he strategically
sets the contract price below the marginal willingness to pay of the buyer (p0 < P (q0)): he
forgoes first-stage profits in order to induce the buyer to invest in a larger equipment capacity,
thus preserving second-stage profits (case c© below).
b© kinf < k ≤ ksup: only the buyer is active. For intermediate values of k , the investment
level is still close to the seller’s preferred level Q( εcε−1), therefore setting p0 = pT >
εc
ε−1 yields
only a second-order loss in both stages compared to the initial situation with a low k , whereas
setting p0 < P (A) = pT would cause a first-order loss (P (A)− p0)A.
c© k > ksup: both parties are active. When k becomes sufficiently large, setting p0 < pT in
order to increase A becomes worthwhile, since the positive volume effect in both stages offsets
the first-stage loss. In this case only, the contract price and the hold-up price differ. The
contract price can even be a decreasing function of k , and become negative when k is high, if
the contract length is short enough: the seller accepts a loss that will be compensated by larger
sales volumes after contract expiry.
A.3 pAp: Comparative statics w.r.t. contract duration
The case where crk < ε− 1− 1ε was detailed in Subsection 5.1. Now assume the opposite holds.
Let
(46)
 Tinf =
1
r ln
(
c
(ε−1)rk
)
,
Tsup =
1
r ln
(
εc+rk
ε(ε−1)rk
)
.
The three cases mentioned in Proposition 7 correspond respectively to T ≤ Tinf , Tinf < T ≤
Tsup and T > Tsup, and to zones a©, b©, and c© in Figure 5.
By assumption, Tsup > 0; Tinf is positive when crk > ε− 1. In what follows, we assume this
is also true (else Case a© is simply empty).
For the buyer, being active, i.e. reducing A below the monopoly quantity, implies an imme-
diate benefit (lower investment expenses), and from T on, a cost (higher pT ).
For the seller, being active, i.e. reducing p0 below the marginal willingness to pay of the
buyer during the contract, implies an immediate cost (lower first-stage profits), and from T on,
a benefit (larger volumes due to increased investment).
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Figure 5: Equilibrium prices as a function of the contract duration (when crk > ε− 1).
a© T ≤ Tinf : both parties are active. For the buyer, the cost of being active is coming up
too early, and he prefers to stay passive and invest A = Q( εcε−1).
b© Tinf < T ≤ Tsup: only the buyer is active. The cost of being active is delayed, it is
worth reducing A: equalizing marginal cost and marginal benefit (k = e
−rT
r
P (A)
ε ) yields A =
Q
(
rerT εk
)
.
c© T > Tsup: both parties are active. When T becomes large, capacity risks to decrease
too much if the seller stays passive. He becomes active and offers a lower p0 to stimulate
investment. Decreasing p0 is a good strategy as long as T is not too large. But as the contract
length approaches infinity, the hold-up period becomes too remote: the seller seeks to preserve
profits made during the contract by increasing p0. When T tends to infinity, the contract price
tends to ppA .
A.4 pAp: Profit and surplus analysis
Profit of the seller. The seller’s profit can be expressed as a function of the contract duration:
a© T ≤ Tinf : Π(T ) = 1r cε−1Q
(
εc
ε−1
)
;
b© Tinf < T ≤ Tsup : Π(T ) = 1r (rerT εk − c)Q
(
rerT εk
)
;
c© T > Tsup : Π(T ) = 1r c+rkε−1 Q
(
ε2(c+rk)
(e−rT+ε)(ε−1)
)
.
The seller’s profit is a non-increasing function of the contract duration: he always prefers
shorter contracts, but actually any contract duration between 0 and Tinf is equivalent for him.
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Surplus of the buyer.
a© T ≤ Tinf : S(T ) = 1r
(
εc
(ε−1)2 − rk
)
Q
(
εc
ε−1
)
;
b© Tinf < T ≤ Tsup : S(T ) = 1r
1−e−rT+ 1
ε
e−rT
ε−1 re
rT εkQ
(
rerT εk
)
;
c© T > Tsup : S(T ) = 1r
1−e−rT+ 1
ε
e−rT
ε−1
ε2(c+rk)
(e−rT+ε)(ε−1)Q
(
ε2(c+rk)
(e−rT+ε)(ε−1)
)
.
The buyer’s surplus function is not monotonous with respect to T : it is first constant, then
decreasing, then increasing and it tends to a finite limit. In addition, the thresholds in T are
not always positive, so that depending on the value of the parameters, cases a© and b© can be
empty.
First suppose crk ≤ ε−1− 1ε : only case c© exists, and since the surplus is a strictly increasing
function of T in this case, the buyer always prefers the longest possible contract.
Now if ε− 1− 1ε ≤ crk ≤ ε− 1, we are either in case b© or in case c©, so the buyer’s surplus
is highest either for T = 0, or when T → +∞. Comparing the two values yields the following
result: the buyer’s surplus is highest for T = 0 if and only if
(47)
c
rk
≤ (ε− 1)ε 1ε−1 − 1.
Finally, when crk ≥ ε− 1, all three cases exist. Clearly the buyer’s surplus is maximal either
for T = 0, or when T tends to infinity. Let y = crk . After rearrangement, we find that the buyer
prefers the shortest possible contract whenever
(48)
(
1− (ε− 1)
2
εy
)(
1 +
1
y
)ε−1
≥ 1.
The derivative with respect to y of the left hand-side has a unique root ε(ε − 1). The LHS is
increasing then decreasing, it tends to −∞ when y tends to zero, and to 1 when y tends to
+∞, thus it is equal to 1 for a unique value of y . Therefore there is a unique y∗ such that
the buyer’s surplus is maximal when T → +∞ whenever y ≤ y∗, and it is maximal for T = 0
whenever y ≥ y∗.
In addition, the LHS is higher than 1 for y = ε(ε− 1), which means that 0 < y∗ < ε(ε− 1).
As a consequence, when the elasticity parameter ε is close to 1, the threshold y∗ is close to
zero, so that for all values of the ratio crk that are bounded away from zero, the buyer prefers
the shortest possible contract.
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